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opinion

Ben EphsonBen Ephson: NPP must be grateful to Arthur K

Story by Isaac Yeboah

Pollster and Editor of the Daily Dispatch newspaper, Ben Ephson, has described Dr. Arthur Kobina Kennedy's book,  as a very fair book.

Ben Ephson told Radio Gold in Accra that a lot of happenings within the New Patriotic Party confirm Dr. Arthur Kennedy's assertions in the book that there was a lack of proper coordination in the prosecution of Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo's campaign to win the presidency, some of which have been denied by those concerned.

{sidebar id=10 align=right}Ben Ephson said for instance, he would take with a pinch of salt, former President J.A. Kufuor's denial of Arthur K's claim in the book that he (Kufuor) did not go to Tain for the 2008 presidential election decider between Nana Addo and Prof. J.E.A. Mills because of security reasons.

He said what has emerged from the former president is that he was told in Wenchi by the NPP campaign team, that the party was seeking an injunction on the election and therefore it would not come on, claiming also that it was while on his way back from Wenchi that he heard on radio, that he (Kufuor) could not make it to Tain because of security reasons,

I must put on record that if you read the book, he also apportions some blame levels to himself and his committee but one thing which comes out clearly is that there was lack of coordination between the campaign team of Nana Akufo-Addo and the presidency. For example if the campaign team of Nana Akufo-Addo had decided that they would not go to Tain to campaign and take part in the election, they could have by a phone-call told the president. The president drove all the way to Wenchi, en-route to Tain for him to be told that they were going to file an injunction, there would be no vote in Tain then he travels back to Accra - clearly this is an example which the president explanation confirmed what Arthur K had used as a lack of coordination in his book. I think the book is a very fair book.

While admitting that he could not think for the president (Kufuor), Ben Ephson asked rhetorically; "If you are the president of the country, would you admit that you felt so insecure that you couldn't go to a place? I think that it's for everybody to judge because if the president said he heard it on radio, once again, he was helping Arthur Kennedy because if you are the president and you hear that they say that you are not going to Tain because of security reasons government in power they had lots of outlets to deny that radio story and nothing was done.

Ben Ephson said the book is a fair book because some of the happenings (which he heard from credible sources and some of which were almost in the public domain) that were said to have happened in the party, including an alleged altercation between Nana Addo and President Kufuor at Wenchi, which might have slighted the party, are not in the book.

I'm saying that if you read Arthur K's book, it's a good book, the grassroots, the foot soldiers will learn something from it, the NPP as they head towards 2012 and the NDC currently in power will also learn a lot from the book.The attempts to try and punch holes in the book will rather cement any holes that they try to create.

He said from where he sits as an outsider, he believed anybody who wished the NPP well would commend Arthur Kennedy for the book.

Source: Myjoyonline.com


review

Book Review: Chasing the Elephant into the Bush

Book Review of Chasing the Elephant into the Bush: The Politics of Complacency

Author: Dr. Arthur Kobina Kennedy

Reviewed By: S. Kwaku Asare, USA

In the aftermath of the 2008 presidential elections, no question haunted NPP leaders and supporters more than why and how Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo Addo, the party's presidential candidate, lost the elections to John Atta Mills, the then NDC candidate, who had been written off by most political analysts. Did the NPP primary season inflict irreparable harm on Akuffo Addo? Did President Kuffuor do enough for the campaign? Did the campaign team spend too much time on big rallies, which attracted curious people, instead of building grassroots organization? Did the campaign team waste valuable time in areas that the candidate had no chance of winning? Was the campaign too slow in responding to allegations by the NDC? Did NDC steal the verdict again? In Chasing the Elephant into the Bush, Dr. Arthur Kobina Kennedy attempts to address some of these questions.

Dr. Kennedy proposes that by the beginning of 2007, NPP had enough support to win a Presidential election with at least 54% of the votes. He argues that even though a smorgasbord of mistakes by the government, party, and the campaign team frittered away most of this comfortable lead, the party, nevertheless, had a narrow but significant lead on Election Day (E-day). But that narrow and significant lead was never actualized because the campaign team failed to protect the vote on E-day. To support this hypothesis, the learned doctor cites the number of rejected votes in NPP strongholds, problems with returning officers and polling agents, and failure to get out the vote in key constituencies.

Turning to the pre-election day faux pas, Dr. Kennedy tells the shocking story (a) of how the campaign team was built, without regard to the principles of effective organization; (b) of a campaign team whose members distrusted each other, and perhaps disliked each other; (c) of a campaign team that did not know how to capitalize on the popularity of President Kuffuor; (d) of a campaign team that had no control of spending, which was the prerogative of a spending committee; (e) of a candidate whose choice of a Vice Presidential candidate was vetoed by Da Rocha, resulting in the choice of a non party member; (f) and of an out of control Kyebi mafia that ruffled feathers and was unaccountable to the campaign.

Although Nana Addo had a campaign team that won an important and seriously contested primary, he decided to emplace a new campaign structure after the December 2007 NPP primary. In so doing, he opted for a complex multi-tier structure that was doomed to fail. Director (Kofi Apraku) and a Campaign Chairman (Jake O. Lamptey) were to run the campaign. However, there was a Coordinating Structure made up of the President, the Candidate, the National Chairman, and the Chairman of the Council of Elders. Below this was the Campaign Committee, made up of the Chairpersons of the 9 or so Campaign Committees, the National Executive of the Party, and 3 other people (Yaw Osarfo Marfo, Hajia Rukaya Ahmed and Ms. Mawuse Ayittey). There was also the Committee of Aspirants, made up of the 16 losing Presidential aspirants, who served in an advisory role to the Campaign Committee (this committee of aspirants met once).

As if that was not enough, there was also a Management Committee, whose membership was unannounced and which operated by invitation only; the various regional and district committees; and the so called independent groups, such as One “Touch group, Friends of Nana Akuffo Addo (FONAA), the Northern Communication Center, etc.

Dr. Kennedy describes in vivid details the problems that beset this complex and behemoth engine ? the overlapping roles and responsibilities, the difficulty of collaboration and maintaining trust, the fissures in the team, and the resignation of Allan Kyeremateng.

On the relationship between key members of the campaign team, Dr. Kennedy tells us that Kofi Apraku and Jake Lamptey were in the same building but did not communicate very well, in spite of repeated suggestions that they should be in daily communication. Similarly, Chairman Mac Manu and Secretary Ntow did not communicate as well. As evidence of distrust in the team, Dr. Kennedy describes a call that he made to Kofi Apraku, who told him “you are running to Jake Lamptey on everything. I am watching that.” Kennedy details many other dysfunctional events, including the exclusion of committee members from meetings, committees that had no control over who was invited to their meetings, failure to consult key committee members prior to key decisions. In consequence, Dr. Kennedy postulates that key people such as Dan Botwe, Kojo Mpiani and the President were underutilized. On the other hand, Kan Dapaah, the minister of Defence, was put in charge of Ashanti region, even though he was a very busy man.

On Allan's resignation, Kennedy writes it was felt that he had not been given a position influential enough or commensurate with his status. But who felt this and did position and status matter? The who part is not answered but Kennedy informs us that position in the various campaign structures did not matter much. What mattered was who had access to the Candidate and the support of those making the spending decisions. Unsurprisingly, the Campaign Committee stopped running the campaign and started following the candidate on the road, leading to the much talked about long convoys.

Dr. Kennedy tells us that the Spending Committee, also called the Databank group, had the power of the purse and became the most important committee. He does not disclose the committee's full membership but it appears Kelly Gadzekpo, Nana Ofori Atta, and Ken Ofori Atta were among those calling the shots. According to the author, nobody was sure when and where the Spending Committee met. Regardless of whatever the Campaign Committee decided, the Spending Committee could make its own decisions as to what to fund and what not to fund, to the frustration and bewilderment of many. As a specific example, the Spending Committee vetoed the Communication Committee's advertising campaigns. In the end, some amongst the Communication Committee who had special links to the Spending Committee developed and propagated adverts without reference to the Communication Committee.

According to Dr. Kennedy, as late as September 2008, was more popular than either Nana Addo or John Mills. Thus, getting him to campaign in the last days would have been helpful. Why did that not happen? The author does not give a definitive reason but he suggests that Kuffuor, through others, indicated he would do whatever he is asked to do, suggesting that the President was not asked to do enough and inviting the speculation that Nana Addo wanted to prove that he could win without Kuffuor. But Kennedy puts to rest the theory that the President did not help by describing other ways that he helped, including assisting in fund raising.

Dr. Kennedy gives an interesting account of the so called Kyebi Mafia. He notes that it is a misnomer since the members are neither exclusively from Kyebi nor are a mafia. Rather, this is the inner circle of the candidate. Of the mafia, the author writes I have no doubt that the family has the best intentions in whatever they do. However, sometimes, in their eagerness to serve Nana’s interest, they ruffle feathers, sometimes very badly and gratuitously. But the mafia did not only ruffle feathers of outsiders, they sometimes undercut one another with extraordinary viciousness. The reader is not giving a complete list of the mafia members but Nana Ofori Atta, Ken Ofori Atta, Edward Ofori Atta (the candidate's brother aka BUMPTY), Nana Asante Bediatuo, and Gabby Otchere Darko are mentioned. Dr. Kennedy describes Gabby as gifted and very hardworking, who is difficult to get along with and who offends people with casual abandon. Dr. Kennedy gives an intriguing account of the events that led to the choice of Mahamadu Bawumia as the Vice Presidential candidate. Unknown to many, the Presidential Candidate had settled on Hajia Alima Mahama long before he won the nomination. Complicating matters he had made this public during a primary campaign at Walewale. On 3rd July 2008, the candidate’s inner circle floated a trial ballon to pave way for the formal announcement and introduction of Hajia Mahama. But Da Rocha punched the air out of that ballon by asserting that if the candidate insisted on picking her, the party should be prepared to change the candidate. The author does not delve seriously into the opposition to Hajia Mahama, except for reiterating the concern that some of those opposing her had, namely, it would be difficult, particularly in the north to sell an unmarried woman on the ticket. But whatever the reasons, Hajia's misfortune proved to be a boondoggle for Mahamadu Bawumia, then deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana. In spite of never being in the race for the nomination and his admission that he was not a party member, the candidate presented him as the Veep candidate to the National Executive Committee, amidst both opposition (Ama Busia, Haruna Esseku, Dan Botwe, Papa Owusu Ankomah, Kwabena Agyepong, and the author) and support (President Kuffuor, Osafo Maafo, Mike Ocquaye, Bin Salia, and Vice President Aliu Mahama). But by that time the Veep nomination fatigue had set in and it become a fait accompli.

Dr. Kennedy tells us that the first round results devastated the campaign team and left it completely unprepared for the runoff. The campaign team run an “agbena campaign (one touch campaign) and had no contingency plan, in spite of the strategic advice that it had received from one Mr. Larry Gibson. The morning after the results were announced, the Campaign Director convened a meeting at which Nana Addo announced changes: (a) he was taking personal control of the entire campaign; (b) Mac Manu was to be the field director with day to day operational control of the campaign; (c) Jake was put in charge of advertising and media relations; (d) some new Regional chairmen were also appointed. But it was just too late to stop the bleeding and the harvest of mistakes continued. For instance, Christine Churcher begged for forgiveness in Cape Coast, which allowed the NDC to ask the rhetorical question, for what sins?” Petrol prices were decreased and incarcerated drivers were released, further angering a discerning electorate. The parliamentary candidates disappeared and the smaller parties did not agree to an alliance. It was just too late in the day to change course, the election night had become dark, and the encircling gloom had become unavoidable.

Dr. Kennedy describes Nana Addo as a very considerate man who does not hold grudges. But he leaves his ex boss with some words of advice. It is up to Nana Addo to learn the strengths and weaknesses of those who desire to serve him and to deploy them to his best advantage. It pays to put competence ahead of loyalty.  To get to the Presidency, Nana must reach significantly beyond his family.

Throughout the campaign season, the NDC members made serious allegations of drug use by Nana Addo. Those of us who supported him were upset that the campaign team had not provided a forceful response. Allegations were also made against key campaign members, including Jake Lamptey (acquisition of lands) and the author (acquisition of a consulting contract). The author did not address any of these allegations, perhaps because the allegations were not serious or credible enough to warrant a response.

Dr. Kennedy devotes a few pages of the book to describe his own failed campaign. He talks about how shocked and bewildered he was that he got one vote, in spite of pledges from the Wenchi, Sawla, and various delegates. He concludes that “the extent of deception, of virtually all candidates, was breath taking.” Kennedy’s shock and bewilderment probably betray his own lack of understanding of perfunctory pledges in the body politic and his failure to listen to contrary advice.

Some final words about Arthur Kennedy. Who better to write this book than a Presidential Aspirant cum Campaign Communication Director? On every page of this book, Kennedy's frustration with the campaign and disappointment in the outcome of the elections show. A seminal book on campaigns in Ghana, Chasing the Elephant to Bush” is a controversial book that is going to attract unfettered praise and widespread criticism. Praise, because it documents what most people suspect or know, and criticism, because critical self-assessment is alien to our body politic. Wherever one lands on the laudatory scale, the book contains valuable lessons for all political operations. This is a book that every politician and student of politics should read.

The book is available at http://www.amazon.com/Chasing-Elephant-into-Bush-Complacency/dp/1449037038/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1259778142&sr=8-1

S. Kwaku Asare, December, 3rd, 2009

Source: Ghanaweb, 04 December 2009

Books

A Book on Otumfuor Osei Tutu II Launched

A book entitled "Otumfour Osei Tutu II- the King on the Golden Stool" which tells about the inspirational leadership style of Otumfour Osei Tutu II as well as history of the Ashanti Kingdom was Wednesday launched at the Manhyia Palace to commemorate the 10th anniversary celebration of the enthronement on the Golden Stool of the Asantehene.

The 96-page all-colour book on Asantehene authored by the Rector of the Africa Institute of Journalism and a former Ashanti Regional Minister, Kojo Yankah and published by UNIMAX MacMillan Company Limited is also expected to be used by students at the Senior High School, tertiary institutions and the general public for research purposes.

The 12 chapter book also gives a series of historical facts about the Ashanti kingdom including the creation and powers of the kingdom, the role of Ashanti traditions to the overall social and economic advancement of the kingdom and Ghana, as well as some facts about the Golden Stool.

It again gives detailed historical background of all the great 16 kings and warriors of the kingdom

The book also captures the history of Asantes, how they became a Kingdom, and roles played by Otumfuor Osei Tutu I and Okomfo Anokye in building and consolidating of the Kingdom.

The rest of the chapters focus on the ten years developmental agenda of Otumfour Osei Tutu II since his ascension to the Golden Stool. Some of Otumfour's achievements include the establishment of the Otumfour Education and Health fund.

Giving the brief about the book, Most Reverend Peter Akwasi Sarpong, Emeritus Metropolitan Catholic Archbishop of Kumasi said it was important for tradition to be documented to serve as a guide to the next generation.

He said there was no other perfect time for the book to be written, especially at this time that the king was marking his tenth anniversary. Most Rev Sarpong commended Mr Yankah for the good work done and hoped the public would patronise the book in order to help them know more about their traditions and culture.

The author, Mr Yankah said he was motivated by the sterling leadership of Asantehene, since his enstoolment a decade ago and that informed his writing of the book

He was optimistic that the book will serve the entire kingdom, Ghana and Africa at large, particularly those who wished to know more about the Ashanti traditions and culture.

Sir Chief Dr Gabriel O Igbenidion, Head of Benin Kingdom in Nigeria, the Special Guest, who officially launched the book bought the first and third copy auctioned for $70,000.

Sir Igbenidion commended Asantehene for giving meaning to traditional rule through innovative programmes for the benefit of his subjects.
He also bought 40 copies for his students in Benin to be used as a syllabus at a cost of $40,000.

Corporate bodies, chiefs, educationists and technocrats also bought copies of the books worth several thousands of Ghana Cedis.

Gabriel Amoah, 03 April 2009

Credit The Statesmanonline



review

Down with Black Imperialism in the North

The flurry of writings on colonial history of Africa has waned since the end of the Cold War. However, questions remain in the former British model colony Gold Coast (Ghana) about how Britain ruled the Northern Territories (northern Ghana) as a Protectorate. Ibrahim Mahama, a lawyer and seasoned politician provides an illuminating account of the struggle between the Germans, French and British in the rush to colonize the Gold Coast Colony/Ashanti Hinterlands. The Hinterlands were made up of present day Northern Ghana, Burkina Faso and Northern Togo. Europeans described those lands res nullius (no man's land).

Mahama, with an eye to making sense of the impact and challenges of British rule, demonstrates that the three European powers used cohesion, warfare, lies, half truth to secure the Hinterlands; with Britain implementing a deliberate policy that made the Hinterlands a labour market for Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony. In this engaging book, Mahama provides fresh information in the seven chapters with two chapters: Education and Economic Development of the Northern Territories and Party politics and Independence as my favourate. The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast Colony/Ashanti remained contested lands until the British secured what is northern Ghana, the French what is Burkina Faso and Germany what is now Togo in 1890s.

The formidable Ashanti Kingdom was a stumbling block to British desire to penetrate the Hinterlands. The Kingdom's policy, jealousy and inaptitude to commerce made it impossible for the British to penetrate the interior. This made Germany to set-up a trade post up the Volta River around Keta-Krachi to link up with the ancient Salaga slave market and also to control the all year round trade routes from Katsina, Bornu, Kano and the Lake Chad Basin.

The kolanut, gold and salt route passed through Sasamadi and Yendi down to Kumasi and the coast. By 1880, the French had taken the lead in sending Captain Binger into the Hinterlands. He was met with disapproval from the chiefs and peoples. French territorial ambitions made British and German colonial offices in Berlin and London in 1888 to agree to share information and consolidate their colonial policies against the French. Britain believed in signing treaties.

The French believed in having a physical presence and moved with lighting speed. The British were slow and lack determination and leadership. It was such French occupational policy that secured Wagadu, Tenkrugu and Sansamadu, thus reducing the influence and power of Mamprulugu and Dagbon kingdoms.

Britain moved troops from Gambaga, then capital of the Protectorate to conquer the Tongo hills in the face of fierce resistance from the Tallensis, Namdams, and Frafras. Dispropotionate fire power was used, which today could earn their leaders as guest at the International Tribunal in The Hague. In Dagbon, the Germans burned down Bimbilla and Yendi in 1897. Following the defeat of Dagbon at the Battle of Adibo, 17 miles on the Yendi-Bimbilla road.

Cheap labour from the Hinterlands enabled cocoa farmers and the gold mines to accumulate wealth. British colonial policy was to prevent the development of education, the key to sustainable development in the north. The first primary school was established in 1909 in Tamale. However, two years earlier, Wemah, the son of a soldier had organized his friends to learn marching, drilling and other forms of military training. He was following his father's steps.

This Boys Company's was later turned into a primary school. Wemah later became a teacher, and a House in Tamale Secondary School bears his name. George Eken Ferguson, a brilliant civil servant was later used by Britain to arrange treaties with a number of chiefs as preluge to colonization. In his discussion with the British agent, the Ya-Naa Andani 11 refused to accept a British proposal that trade in Dagbon be monopolized by Britain. The king said Dagbon was a free kingdom and trade should be free. All were welcomed.

Following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, and under the League of Nations’ mandate, Britain administered German Togoland and subsequent plebiscite allowed German Togoland to join the Gold Coast for Independence in 1957. This re-united the Dagbon Kingdom, as she was divided into British and German sections. The Yaa-Naa who is based in Yendi effectively lost more than half his Kingdom.

The colonial officers forbid the Chiefs and people in Western Dagbon from contacting the Ya-Naa. However, the Yo-Na Pegu (Chief of Savelugu, and the most senior Dagbon chief in the British sector) had secret contacts with the King in Yendi. When colonial officers found out, he was des-skinned and sent to the village of Tong.

Yo-Na Pegu is my maternal grandfather.

The British policy of manipulating pupils was so serious that they deliberately failed pupils to reduce the number to middle and secondary schools. By independence in March 1957, the north had a population of 1,288.920 with only one graduate in the person of Alhassan Gbanzaba who through some British humanitarian official was educated at Cambridge University. Sadly, Gbanzaba died in 1958. At independence there were very few persons from the north in the civil service, prompting one of the NPP's leaders J. A. Brimah to state loudly: Down with Black Imperialism in the North! Some may argue it's the reality today, despite more than 50 years of Black rule (independence).

One of the interesting aspects of the book is the discourse on party politics in the 1950s. An alien but necessary culture, argues Mahama. The Northern People's Party (NPP) was formed in Tamale on 11 April 1954 with the objective of ensuring that the control and direction of government in the country as a whole shall pass into the hands of the chiefs and their people as soon as they are capable to assume full responsibility and to press for the immediate development and progress of the Protectorate.

The NPP leadership was made up of Yakubu Tali, Mumuni Bawunai, S.D. Dombo, J.A. Brimah, Jato Kaleo, B.K. Adama, Salifu Imoro, Adam Amandi and Abaifa Karbo. While Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) was formed June 12 1949. It focused its popular political mobilization in the Colony and Ashanti. CPP won six seats from the north in the 1954 election, while the NPP won 12 with two independent candidates aligned to it.

In the 1956 general elections nation wide, the NPP won 15 seats, the CPP 71, while the Ashanti based National Liberation Movement (NLM) had 12. Thus S. D. Dombo leader of the NPP was the first official opposition leader in Parliament and not K.A. Busia as the revisionists in the New Patriotic Party (NPP) of president John Agyekum Kufour were propagating during the Ghana@50 celebrations two years ago. Until lions learn to write, hunters would always have a field day, so says a proverb from southern Africa.

The Northern People's Party’s (NPP) opposition to the CPP's slogan Independence Now! had a historical reason. In explaining its opposition, the Ya Naa Mahama 111 in 1949 told a group of southern politicians who were visiting Yendi that, if a man had three wives and they are all pregnant, the first 9 months, the second, 6 and the last 3 months.

The first woman is delivering and demands the rest to deliver the same day, same time. Was that possible, the King asked the southern politicians? The Gold Coast Colony was under British rule for 150 years with functioning schools, hospitals, railways, civil service, paved roads, enhanced trade centres etc same with Ashanti which was under British rule for 50 years.

The Northern Protectorate had nothing from British rule, except some 900 non-motorable roads. Mahama argues the only valuable economic assets the British gave to the people were the road system, even though not motorable. The 900 miles began from Attebubu, which was part of the Protectorate to Bawku, Wa and Yendi. The only national agency which could have enhanced the development of the north, the Vet institute in Pong-Tamale was taken to Accra.

Following its formation, the NPP leaders began systematic opposition to independence in 1957, advocating that Independence had to be linked to the north's rapid development. Mumuni Bawunia, (who later became a Minister under Nkrumah and Chairman of the Council of State under the John Jerry Rawlings' presidency-1993-2000) epitomized that.

We are not against our Southern brothers, but we are against political and economic domination by the South. We are against anything that will curtail our own freedom. The NPP demanded a marshal plan costing 8 million UK pounds. The CPP was against the agitation for a federal government by the NLM. Nkrumah sought to alleviate the fears of the people's of the north.

To the great pan-African leader the debate over federation was only between the Ashanti and the CPP. He promised massive development for the north post Independence. The CPP government (1957-1966) is the only government that delivered its electoral promise to northern Ghana since Independence.

The alliance between the NPP and the National Liberation Movement (NLM) of Ashanti is discussed in depth. Mahama suggests that such a strategic alliance between the NPP and the CPP would have been far better for the north. This would have made the Protectorate's development higher and higher on the CPP agenda.

This well though critique amounts to a stinging indictment of British colonial policy-the foundation for the underdevelopment of northern Ghana. It is a plea for rapid development of Northern Ghana. Which, sadly the post 1966 military and civilian dictatorial regimes deepen with the destruction of agriculture and the non-exploitation of minerals such as gold, and iron ore. Ghana spends several hundreds of millions of dollars in importing rice, beef, milk and onions; the latter from landlocked Niger, whose soils are no better than those of Ghana. And yet, the country lacks coherent and actionable agricultural policy. A good actionable development plan could up-lift the North and other parts of the country from poverty.

The military nationalists in the regime of the populist Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong demonstrated and succeeded in their agricultural policy between 1972-1974. And, yet after 35 years of Operation Feed Yourself, we are still at the mercy of incompetent bureacrats, politicians and their foreign backers. Yesterday, it was Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), and Programme for the Mitigation of Poverty (PAMP).

Today, the song across Africa is on Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The improvement in agriculture in landlocked Burkina Faso, once part of the Hinterlands is not from heaven, but from thought and action by its leaders and people. Looking East and acting locally or in the words of Uncle Dan Lartey domestication is our answer.

This book is Ghana's guilty secret. A must read for those interested in using the state to create the enabling environment to reduce abject poverty and systematic armed violence, It is a compelling reading for all those politicians and civil society leaders interested in understanding and contributing to the north's development. Mahama's exposition is a profoundly informative for those who are concern with consolidating democracy, peace and national unity in the former British model colony. Finally, its only the good people of northern Ghana who can develop their regions. We better understand that. And yes, we can!

By Ibrahim Mahama, Gillbt Press, Tamale, 2009, 140pp, price not stated.



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Napoleon Abdulai, works with the UNDP as CTA, SSR. Writing in his personal capacity. Napoleonabdulai2@yahoo.co.ukThis email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Source: Ghanaweb, Saturday, 08 August 2009